Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012

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Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012

Facts: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. 

Issue:

 Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution. 

Held:
 Yes. The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. 

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.

The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress. It may be a constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an absurdity.

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception of the Doctrine of Operative Fact applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.

The Court has no power to add another member by judicial construction.

The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked to guard the Constitution against usurpation. The Court remains steadfast in confining its powers in the sphere granted by the Constitution itself. Judicial activism should never be allowed to become judicial exuberance. In cases like this, no amount of practical logic or convenience can convince the Court to perform either an excision or an insertion that will change the manifest intent of the Framers. To broaden the scope of congressional representation in the JBC is tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter which was not included in the provision as enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor constitutional provisions in order to accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the proposed solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines.

In Re: Manzano (1988) - Case Digest

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Cases in relation to Article VII, Sec. 12




IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.

Facts:

On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, sent the Supreme Court a letter which reads:

x x x

By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the Honorable Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C. Farinas, I was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856 of 12 December 1986, as amended by Executive Order No. 326 of June 1, 1988. In consonance with Executive Order RF6-04, the Honorable Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte issued my appointment as a member of the Committee. For your ready reference, I am enclosing herewith machine copies of Executive Order RF6-04 and the appointment.

Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the powers and duties of the position as member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, may I have the honor to request for the issuance by the Honorable Supreme Court of a Resolution, as follows:

(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to as assume and discharge the powers and duties attached to the said position;

(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither violative of the Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of Section .7, Article IX (B), both of the Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an abandonment of my present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, and as a member of the Judiciary; and

(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part of the primary functions of an Executive Judge.

Issue:

Whether Judge Manzano can serve concurrently as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice

Held:

                No. Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution). Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, his request must be denied.

                While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.

This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANNY GODOY JUDGE EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR vs. MAURICIO REYNOSO, JR. and EVA P. PONCE DE LEON - Case Digest

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANNY GODOY
JUDGE EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR vs. MAURICIO REYNOSO, JR. and EVA P. PONCE DE LEON




Facts: A complaint was filed by judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, to cite for indirect contempt Mauricio Reynoso, Jr., a columnist, and Eva P. Ponce de Leon, publisher and chairman of the editorial board, respectively, of the Palawan Times. His Honor's plaint is based on an article written by respondent Reynoso, Jr. in his column, "On the Beat," and published in the July 20, 1994 issue of said newspaper which is of general circulation in Puerto Princesa City. The complaint avers that the article tends to impede, obstruct, belittle, downgrade and degrade the administration of justice; that the article contains averments which are disrespectful, discourteous, insulting, offensive and derogatory; that it does not only cast aspersions on the integrity and honesty of complainant as a judge and on his ability to administer justice objectively and impartially, but is an imputation that he is biased and he prejudges the cases filed before him; and that the article is sub judice because it is still pending automatic review.

Issue: Who has jurisdiction in contempt proceedings where the alleged contumely is committed against a lower court while the case is pending in the Appellate or Higher Court

Held: In whatever context it may arise, contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. As a matter of practical judicial administration, jurisdiction has been felt properly to rest in only one tribunal at a time with respect to a given controversy. Partly because of administrative considerations, and partly to visit the full personal effect of the punishment on a contemnor, the rule has been that no other court than the one contemned will punish a given contempt. 

The rationale that is usually advanced for the general rule that the power to punish for contempt rests with the court contemned is that contempt proceedings are sui generis and are triable only by the court against whose authority the contempt are charged; the power to punish for contempt exists for the purpose of enabling a court to compel due decorum and respect in its presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders and processes: and in order that a court may compel obedience to its orders, it must have the right to inquire whether there has been any disobedience thereof, for to submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal would operate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency. 

There are, however, several jurisprudentially and statutorily recognized exceptions to the general rule, both under Philippine and American jurisprudence, viz.:

1. Indirect contempt committed against inferior court may also be tried by the proper regional trial court, regardless of the imposable penalty.
2. Indirect contempt against the Supreme Court may be caused to be investigated by a prosecuting officer and the charge may be filed in and tried by the regional trial court, or the case may be referred to it for hearing and recommendation where the charge involves questions of fact.
3. In People vs. Alarcon, et al., supra, this Court ruled that "in the interrelation of the different courts forming our integrated judicial system, one court is not an agent or representative of another and may not, for this reason, punish contempts in vindication of the authority and decorum which are not its own. The appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court , and this last court becomes thereby charged with the authority to deal with contempts committed after the perfection of the appeal." The apparent reason is that both the moral and legal effect of a punishment for contempt would be missed if it were regarded as the resentment of personal affronts offered to judges. Contempts are punished as offenses against the administration of justice, and the offense of violating a judicial order is punishable by the court which is charged with its enforcement, regardless of the court which may have made the order. However, the rule presupposes a complete transfer of jurisdiction to the appellate court, and there is authority that where the contempt does not relate to the subject matter of the appeal, jurisdiction to punish remains in the trial court.
4. A court may punish contempts committed against a court or judge constituting one of its parts or agencies, as in the case of a court composed of several coordinate branches or divisions.
5. The biggest factor accounting for the exceptions is where the singular jurisdiction of a given matter has been transferred from the contemned court to another court. One of the most common reasons for a transfer of jurisdiction among courts is improper venue. The cases involving venue deal primarily with the question whether a change of venue is available after a contempt proceeding has been begun. While generally a change of venue is not available in a contempt proceeding, some jurisdictions allow such a change in proper circumstances.
6. A new court wholly replacing a prior court has jurisdiction to punish for violations of orders entered by its predecessor, although where the successor court is created by a statute which does not extinguish jurisdiction in the predecessor, an affirmative transfer of jurisdiction before the contempt occurs is necessary to empower the successor court to act.
7. Transfers of jurisdiction by appellate review have produced numerous instances where contempt against the trial court has been punished in the appellate court, and vice versa. Some appellate courts have taken the view that a contempt committed after an appeal is taken is particularly contemptuous of the appellate court because of the tendency of such contempts to upset the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of such court.
8. A judge may disqualify himself, or be disqualified, on a contempt hearing or in the main case, which circumstance may require a transfer of jurisdiction, but where a judge is disqualified only in the main case, because of matters which do not disqualify him in a contempt proceeding, the regular judge should sit in the contempt proceeding. Likewise, where the regular judge, is absent or otherwise unavailable and an order is entered by another judge and made returnable to the proper court, the regular judge may punish for violations of orders so entered.
9. Where the same act is a contempt against two or more courts, it is no bar to contempt proceedings in one of them that there is also a contempt against the other.
10. While professional disciplinary proceedings have been resorted to as a punishment for contempt, the more recent view is that punishment is of secondary importance to the need to protect the courts and the people from improper professional practice. To the substantial extent that disciplinary action remains a punishment, disciplinary measures imposed by another court than the one contemned furnish an exception to the rule against punishing for contempt of another court.
11. Some contemptuous acts are also crime, usually misdemeanors, which are often punishable in other courts than those against which the contemptuous act was done.
12. Finally, a conviction for contempt against another court has been allowed to stand on the basis that the failure of the defendant to make timely objection operated as a waiver of the right to be 
tried before the court actually contemned.

The rule, as now accepted and deemed applicable to the present incident, is that where the entire case has already been appealed, jurisdiction to punish for contempt rests with the appellate court where the appeal completely transfers the proceedings thereto or where there is a tendency to affect the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Accordingly, this Court having acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for indirect contempt against herein respondents, it has taken judicial cognizance thereof and has accordingly resolved the same.

Luz Adajar vs Teresita Develos (2005) - Case Digest

Constitutional Law 1 - Case Digests

On the Supreme Court's Supervision Over Lower Courts

Facts: Luz C. Adajar filed a complaint against Teresita Develos, Cyrus Ellorin and Celsa Ellorin, who are government employees stationed at the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Complainant alleged that she delivered pieces of jewelries on a consignment basis amounting to 70,000 pesos to Mrs. Teresita Develuz at her office at RTC Branch 8 Staff Room, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon with the agreement that she will pay the said amount within Three (3) Months. Mrs. Develuz made partial payments in the total amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos. However, when  demanded from to pay the balance of P20,000.00  Pesos, she refused. On February 6, 2002 complainant, again, went to RTC Branch 8 to collect the account from Mrs. Develuz when the latter, in an angry and loud voice said, “Dili ba nga gihatagan ta naman ka sa listahan sa mga nakakuha sa alahas?  Ikaw na ang maningil sa ila”, (which in English literally means “IS IT NOT THAT I HAVE ALREADY GIVEN YOU THE LIST OF THOSE WHO GOT THE JEWELRIES? YOU COLLECT IT YOURSELF”). While having a verbal tussle, Mr. Cyrus Ellorin who is a co-employee of Mrs. Develuz, with the designation of court interpreter of Branch 8, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, allegedly, went near and shouted.  Mr. Cyrus Ellorin violently pushed complainant of the staff room, practically driving her out as if she was a leper. Employees of the office of the Clerk of Court brought her to their office and gave her water and comforted her.  The incident was reported to the police and entered into the blotter.

Respondents contend that the acts of respondents Celsa Ellorin and Teresita Develos being complained of by complainant were not in relation to their functions as court employees but were in connection with the pecuniary activity of complainant. Respondents further assert that complainant is guilty of dishonesty for certifying that she did not commence any other action before any tribunal or body except before this Court when in fact she also filed a complaint for misconduct with the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao.  Respondents also submitted in evidence a Joint-Affidavit executed by persons who were indebted to complainant stating therein that respondent Develos simply facilitated the sale of jewelry made by complainant.

Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao, acting on the complaint for misconduct filed by herein complainant, rendered a Decision dismissing the administrative case against herein respondents as well as the counter-complaint filed by the latter against herein complainant.

The Investigating Judge adopted the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao and, accordingly, recommended that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should take cognizance of this case

Held:  

No, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao should not have taken cognizance of the instant case the same being administrative in nature.  As correctly pointed out by the OCA, it has been settled as early as the case of Maceda vs. Vasquez that:

 Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.  By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of power.

Pursuant to the above-settled rule, the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao should have referred the instant complaint to this Court for appropriate action, instead of resolving the same.  Hence, we agree with the OCA that the Decision rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao in OMB-M-A-02-126-E does not have any force and effect on the present administrative case before us.